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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the role of the tax agent as a preparer of tax returns 
and  provider  of  professional  tax  advice  under  a  system  based  on  self-
assessment principles. In particular it recognises the competing pressures 
under  which  tax  agents  attempt  to  discharge  their  professional 
responsibilities, and the implications for potentially unethical behaviour. 
 
Empirical research into taxpayer attitudes suggests that the risk of audit, the 
severity of tax law and the materiality of dollar amounts involved, will all 
impact on the decision making process. This paper extends these principles 
from taxpayer to tax agent, by seeking their response to alternative client 
demands as represented in realistic tax return scenarios. 
 
The findings suggest that the severity of tax law violation is an important 
factor  in  ethical  decision  making,  but  that  audit  risk  and  the  amounts 
involved are not. The lack of support for audit risk as an influential variable 
is  an  important  outcome,  because  policy  makers  have  traditionally 
proceeded on the basis that increases in audit probabilities will reduce the 
likelihood  of  taxpayers  adopting  aggressive  tax  reporting  positions.  The 
implications are that alternative enforcement and compliance strategies must 
be considered by tax administrators. 
 
 
      
1.  Introduction 
 
The potentially ambiguous application of increasingly complex taxation laws to 
particular factual situations means that tax professionals often face dilemmas in arriving at 
appropriate and supportable tax reporting positions. Their decision making may also be 
subject to pressures, sometimes competing, from disparate groups such as clients, the 
government through its revenue authority – the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) in the 
Australian context, employers, the business and financial community, and professional 
accounting associations. In resolving these conflicts and in discharging their professional 
responsibilities inevitably ethical and moral issues will arise. 
 
The fundamental ethical issue involves an evaluation of the appropriate role of the tax 
practitioner. It has been suggested that the ‘modern tax practitioner has either assumed or had 
thrust upon him certain responsibilities peculiar to his practice, and not common to all areas 
of practice within the legal and accounting professions’ (Oatway, 1965, p.237). Accordingly, 
it is necessary to consider whether tax practitioners have a collective or civic allegiance, albeit 
imprecisely defined, to the efficient administration of the tax system and the public at large 
(by reinforcing the community value of taxation) in addition to maintaining client loyalty. 
Carey and Doherty (1992), in recognition of the important role played by certified public 
accountants (CPAs) in the United States self- assessment tax system, note that: 
 
“The  wide  acceptance  of  the  CPA  as  a  tax  adviser  has  contributed 
substantially to the successful administration of the income tax laws – often 
described as a voluntary self-assessing tax system. Thus, in tax practice, the 
CPA  again  finds  himself  in  a  position  of  multiple  responsibilities.  He 
obviously has a primary duty to his client. But he must also recognize an 
obligation to the government and to the public” (p.82).  
 
Tax practitioners may also be subject to a wide range of ethical issues pertaining to client 
loyalty and to preserving/developing their own tax practice income on a day-to-day basis. 
These issues include: acquiring and maintaining appropriate levels of technical competence; 
determining in what circumstances they should recommend the adoption of “overly 
aggressive” reporting positions with respect to contentious tax matters; whether previously 
undetected errors from earlier returns should be reported. Tax preparer literature in the U.S.     2
     
suggests that preparers contribute to taxpayer compliance in unambiguous areas but contribute 
to aggressive tax reporting/non-compliance in ambiguous areas (Kaplan, Reckers, Boyd and 
West, 1988; Klepper and Nagin, 1989). Aggressive tax reporting refers to situations in which 
the tax practitioner selects the reporting position that represents events favourably to the 
taxpayer when that position is not indicated clearly by the facts, appropriate authorities or 
relevant professional literature (Cuccia, Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1995).  
 
West and Clevenger (1995) have identified a number of areas of ethical concern arising 
from the tax preparation, reporting and planning activities of the tax practitioner’s role as the 
intermediary agent between the client and the revenue authority. The broad ethical issues that 
arise from the various aspects of the tax practitioner’s role are identified below: 
 
Tax practitioner as advisor: Here the tax practitioner’s role is one of assisting the taxpayer 
to create transactions/establish tax-effective structures and develop relevant facts, rather than 
being limited to the presentation and legal characterisation of historical facts. The tax 
practitioner is placed in the position of attempting to balance the client’s desire to reduce tax 
liability to an acceptable minimum, while also considering any rights of affected third parties, 
the public and the potential impact on the integrity of the tax system, when devising a strategy 
for the client. These supplementary duties arise from the privileged intermediary role enjoyed 
by the practitioner as the independent tax professional on whom the ATO relies for the 
efficient operation of the tax system.  
 
Ethical standards in a tax planning context: Many transactions and arrangements 
categorised as “tax planning” will not be fraudulent and prohibited on legal grounds. In many 
instances, however, there will be doubt as to whether the matters will withstand close factual 
and legal analysis. These contentious issues inevitably raise concerns about a tax practitioner 
meeting his or her duty to the tax system in giving advice and in preparing tax returns.  
 
Cuccia et al. (1995) emphasise that tax practitioners are aware that they may have to 
justify their reporting positions in the future, and that the potential for penalties depends on an 
assessment by the revenue authority as to whether they are seen as applying standards 
appropriately. In this regard it must be remembered that people do not have a uniform 
capacity to integrate factual and conceptual complexity, or to arrive at the same conclusions 
and judgments. Tax advice will depend heavily on individual tax agent judgment. Further, the     3
     
capacity of statutory thresholds to constrain aggressive reporting may be diminished when 
expressions like “reasonably arguable” and “reasonable care”, as used to denote the thresholds 
in the Australian legislation, are seen as vague and open to liberal interpretation: “Ceteris 
paribus, the more liberal the interpretation of the standard, the more likely the evidence will 
support an aggressive reporting position” (Cuccia et al., 1995, p.230).  
 
Extent of research required to render advice: A tax practitioner requires sufficient 
evidence, technical knowledge, experience and skill to reasonably expect to complete services 
rendered with professional competence. In the competitive environment of tax practice and 
for a variety of reasons, however, the client and tax practitioner may agree to limit the amount 
of research conducted. In these situations the tax practitioner should still do enough to come 
to an informed judgment regarding the issue.  
 
Duty to ascertain facts provided by the client: The tax practitioner is entitled to rely on 
facts given by a client, without the need for independent verification or audit. Where the tax 
practitioner discovers inconsistencies or inadequacies in any data or information supplied, 
then reasonable enquiries should still be made.  
 
Tax practitioner obligation with respect to transaction documentation: The fundamental 
ethical issue is whether or not facts shown or created in documents are in substance consistent 
with the standards governing the tax practitioner’s professional conduct. The tax practitioner 
should not create or support false or misleading information. For example, when timing issues 
are essential to the tax treatment of transactions, the tax practitioner cannot falsify the dates 
surrounding the transaction. 
 
The quality of any professional advice ultimately is a function of technical competence 
and the exercise of professional judgment. Ethical questions will arise whenever the decision 
maker has the freedom to exercise choice within a range of options and those decisions have 
consequences for the welfare of others (Jones 1991; Shaw and Barry 1992). This 
judgment/decision making function will, in turn, be dependent upon the integrity, professional 
experience and personal values of the professional making the decisions between the various 
alternatives. As a consequence, the advice will generally not be value-free. The tax 
practitioner must operate within a decision-making environment which is characterised by 
potential conflicts or tensions which involve considerations such as: the technical provisions     4
     
of the tax law; the preferences, expectations and risk propensities of clients; directives (and 
potential penalties) of the revenue authority (ATO); and the application of professional ethical 
rules and standards. This is a process which Bandy, Judd and Kelliher (1993) describe as ‘as 
clear cut as distinguishing between shades of gray’ (p.5).  
 
A consequence of the reliance of Australian taxpayers on tax agents in the preparation 
and filing of accurate tax returns is that tax agents are in a position to exert a strong and direct 
influence on the compliance and tax administration processes (see Erard, 1993 in the U.S. 
context). To the extent that a failure of a tax agent (acting as the moral agent of their clients) 
to act ethically in transacting tax matters results in an “inaccurate” return or causes taxation 
auditors to not detect an item which would otherwise be challenged, the failure can contribute 
to a reduced level of taxpayer compliance. This influence is even more pervasive in a tax 
system in which ATO audit and collection resources are limited. Although the final decision 
on any course of action will be made by the taxpayer, that person will inevitably be influenced 
significantly by the advice and actions of the tax professional to whom a fee is being paid. A 
major potential conflict then arises because codes of conduct and ethics only establish lines of 
consensus impropriety. Theoretically, ethics requires more from a person than technical 
compliance with rules (Falk, 1985). 
 
In spite of an increasing awareness of the ethical perspective of tax practice, very little 
empirical research in this area has been conducted in Australia. The dearth of such research 
means that little is known about the personality, demographic, organisational and situational 
factors that may have an impact on tax practitioners’ ethics-related decision making within the 
range of potentially conflicting aspects of the tax practitioner’s role analysed by West and 
Clevenger (1995). It is also against a backdrop of a significant growth in the usage of tax 
agents –72% of Australian taxpayers used tax agents to prepare tax returns in 1992, compared 
with only 20% in 1980  (National Review of Standards for the Tax Profession, 1994, p.xvii).  
 
In an attempt to redress this research void, a survey of Western Australian tax agents 
was undertaken. A behavioural experimental component was incorporated into the study to 
determine whether selected situational variables influence or moderate tax agent ethical 
perceptions in decision-making.  
     5
     
Various descriptive “causal” models have been developed to provide a theoretical 
framework for the ethical decision-making process within a business context (see, for 
example, Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Hunt and Vitell, 1986; Lampe and Finn, 1992). In 
summary, all of these “models” of ethical decision-making drawn from business ethics 
literature contain four common elements, identified by Brady and Hatch (1992) as: 
 “(1) a decision process, modified by (2) internal and (3) external factors, leading to (4) 
ethical or unethical behavior, all of which are connected by arrows representing causes or 
consequences” (p.308).  
 
Thus, two broad categories of variables are catalogued to interact with and influence 
decision-making when individuals confront ethical dilemmas. The first category incorporates 
individual factors, including level of moral development. The second category consists of 
those situational/background factors that are viewed as moderators between behavioural 
predisposition and actual behaviour. There is, however, no consensus as to which specific 
situational variables should be included in such a model.  
 
The particular variables under review in this study: audit risk, materiality of the issue 
and severity of the tax law in dispute, were selected from business ethics empirical research in 
the accounting/auditing, management and marketing disciplines because of their likely 
relevance to tax practice. Tax compliance research was used to supplement the paucity of 
specific tax evidence in this area. They were characterised by three basic selection criteria. 
First, they can be associated with the individual tax practitioner, rather than with the firm or 
organisational structure within which the practitioner may operate. Second, they are present 
(potentially, at least) in all tax practice situations. Third, they have been the subject of 
empirical research in business ethics and/or compliance related literature. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to report on the impact of these factors, with the emphasis 
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2.   Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1   Audit Risk 
 
The independent variable of primary interest is the influence of the risk/probability of 
audit by the ATO on the ethical perceptions of tax agents. The potential practical costs of that 
risk in terms of loss suffered by the tax agent’s professional practice or employer i.e., 
“business risk” as identified by Brumfield, Elliott and Jacobson (1983), are outside the scope 
of this study. These costs include: the time and expense of defending law suits brought by 
clients, the imposition of penalties/deregistration, diminution of professional reputation, and 
possible loss of clients. 
 
The reviewed empirical literature indicates that opportunity to engage in unethical 
behaviour has an influence on the unethical behaviour of CPAs (e.g., Loeb, 1972). However, 
it is unclear how much opportunity is necessary for it to become an influential factor in 
determining unethical behaviour, and whether ethical perceptions of issues are influenced by 
the opportunity to act unethically.   
 
Expectations about the probability of an event’s detection were found to be more 
important in determining risk taking than the magnitude of the expected consequence 
(Dickson, 1978). Further, Malone and Roberts (1996) conducted a study into the failure of 
auditors to properly execute all appropriate audit steps (reduced audit quality-RAQ-
behaviours). A significant empirical finding of their study was that of a strong inverse 
relationship between auditors’ perceptions of their firm’s ability to detect and punish those 
who commit RAQ acts and the auditors’ incidence of RAQ behaviours. Thus, in a tax context, 
it would be anticipated that a perceived low probability of detection through an ATO audit 
activity would be reflected in an increased level of unethical behaviour such as aggressive tax 
reporting i.e., exploration of the “audit lottery”, defined by Temple (1991) as: 
 
 ‘…the taxpayer’s statistical likelihood of over 98% that she would not be 
audited, augmented by the additional possibility that the issue would not be 
uncovered by the IRS examiner in the unlikely event of an audit’ (p.325). 
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Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992) also suggest that individuals tend to overweight the 
probability of an audit relative to what would be anticipated with regard to the expected utility 
model.  
 
The ATO maintains a system of controls to encourage compliance with tax laws. These 
are represented by enforcement or punishment policies (e.g., audit activities, penalty 
provisions); preventive controls (e.g., withholding systems of taxation collection); and 
administrative efficiency in detecting and policing under-reporting practices. These measures 
collectively represent a significant contributing factor to the overall level of taxpayer non-
compliance (Strader and Fogliasso, 1989). Ultimately, it is likely that they will also have an 
impact on tax agents’ perceived expectations that unethical tax practices will be detected by 
the ATO.  
 
The amount of compliance or non-compliance depends on a complex mix of conditions 
and factors. However, in a number of empirical, experimental studies of U.S. taxpayer 
behaviour, the influence of the probability of audit on compliance decisions has been found to 
be highly significant (e.g., Chang, Nicholls and Schultz, 1987; Smith and Kinsey,1987). The 
evidence in support of this finding is more equivocal when the argument is extended to tax 
practitioners. In a modelling of taxpayer compliance using tax professionals as subjects, 
Madeo, Schepanski and Uecker (1987) found that the probability of audit (measured as the 
likelihood of detection through varying the source of income) was the most significant factor 
affecting adopted tax positions on contentious tax issues. Kaplan et al. (1988), in their study, 
also identified the probability of audit (manipulated experimentally) as a major influence on 
the tax advice offered by their tax preparer subjects. 
 
Duncan, LaRue and Reckers (1989) examined, in an experimental setting, tax 
professionals’ recommendations to taxpayers on reporting positions. In contrast to the 
findings of the above studies, they found that the change in audit probability had no 
significant effect on tax practitioners’ recommended reporting positions. Part of the 
explanation for the contrasting results may lie in the extreme levels of variation of audit rates 
in the studies of Madeo et al. (1987) and Kaplan et al. (1988) compared with the more modest 
10%-25% variation in the Duncan et al. (1989) study.  
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The above discussion provides the basis for the following hypothesis to be tested:  
 
H1:  The probability of ATO audit detection will influence a tax practitioner’s              
perceived ethical judgments (Audit Risk).  
 
2.2   Materiality 
 
The ethical perceptions of tax agents are also likely to be influenced by the level of 
financial return. The two dimensions to this materiality factor are: 
 
(1)  the amount of tax involved (“quantitative materiality”); and 
(2)  the severity of violation of the tax law (“qualitative materiality”) e.g.,  whether 
expenses are arguably deductible or clearly not deductible.   
 
Conventional economic models of tax compliance are based on the assumption that taxpayer 
reporting behaviour is primarily financially motivated, having regard to the perceived costs 
and benefits of the action. This expected utility theory, in which people are regarded as 
amoral, rational decision makers, was first applied (in explanation of tax evasion) by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). The approach was expanded by Cowell (1985) to take 
account of the source of income with trade-offs between legal income (subject to withholding 
tax at source) and illegal income (those sources of income which the revenue authorities find 
difficult to detect). Within this economic-based theoretical framework, taxpayers/tax 
practitioners acting on behalf of taxpayers are expected to make compliance decisions that 
will maximize the value of marginal tax dollars and minimize the risk of penalties (Carroll, 
1992). Two of the most significant factors found to influence the compliance decision are 
therefore the individual’s level of income and the tax rate, which acting together determine 
the level of the taxpayer’s disposable income. 
 
Hutton (1985) investigated the perceptions of U.S. tax practitioners regarding the impact 
of the introduction of a number of “new” penalties (imposed on the taxpayer) on professional 
tax practice. The penalties were specifically directed at aggressive tax planning. That is, the 
treatment of questionable or contentious items in a tax return in a manner that was clearly not 
a correct treatment under existing taxation law and its interpretation, having regard to a     9
     
perceived widespread practice of playing the “audit lottery”. The provisions provided 
penalties for the substantial understatement of tax liability, i.e., the larger the understatement 
(amount of tax involved), the greater the penalty imposed. Almost sixty percent of respondent 
tax practitioners in Hutton’s study perceived the understatement penalty legislation as having 
a strong to very strong effect on their approach to aggressive tax planning. 
 
A similar shortfall penalty regime, with particular focus on “reasonable care” and 
“reasonably arguable positions” has been introduced in Australia in support of the move 
towards a full self-assessment income tax system. Although the penalties are imposed on the 
taxpayer, the tax practitioner is likely to feel the impact of these penalties in the form of 
damage to client relationships, potential civil liability and loss of professional 
reputation/challenge to personal and professional ethics. Taxpayers who, because of their high 
level of income and tax liability, are most at risk in relation to the imposition of such penalties 
are likely to have a professional tax practitioner prepare their tax returns. 
 
Buttross (1991), in a study of U.S. management accountants with responsibility for 
income tax compliance, found a statistically significant relationship between the severity of 
the tax law violation and ethical decision- making. The severity of the tax law was considered 
important because the law is assumed to establish a base for ethical behaviour. Also of 
interest, is the question of whether tax practitioners make distinctions between different levels 
of the law. Violation of the spirit or intent of income tax law, although satisfying the letter of 
the law, would be expected to result in lower levels of ethical perceptions than would more 
blatant violations of the substantive provisions.   
 
These considerations lead to the following hypotheses for testing: 
H2:   The dollar amount of a client’s tax law violation will influence a tax practitioner’s 
perceived ethical judgments (Amount).  
H3:   The severity of violation of the tax law by a client will influence a tax 
practitioner’s perceived ethical judgments (Severity).            
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3. Research Method 
 
3.1   Subjects 
 
Most tax work in Australia, particularly in relation to tax return preparation work, is 
performed by registered tax agents (or their employees) who generally have accounting 
qualifications. Solicitors seldom prepare tax returns and their involvement tends to be in an 
advisory capacity, or where an adversarial situation has developed between the ATO and the 
tax agent and his/her client. The concept of a single “tax profession” or tax practitioner is 
difficult to comprehend. In practice, the term “tax practitioner” covers a diverse group of 
individuals, business structures and professional groups who provide a range of tax services 
for their clients. Self-employed and “in-house” accountants, tax advisers, registered tax 
agents, tax agent franchisees and legal practitioners in the tax arena are all embraced by the 
term “tax practitioner”. 
 
Although each category should be considered separately, as determined by the National 
Review of Standards for the Tax Profession (the Review) established in Australia in 1992, the 
emphasis in Australia must be on “tax agents”. Although this term is not defined in the 
income tax legislation (the Act), by implication it is taken to be a person (including a 
partnership or company) who or which is registered to prepare, for a fee, income tax returns 
and transact business on behalf of taxpayers in income tax matters (see Part VIIA of the Act). 
Against this background, this study is limited to those tax practitioners who were registered as 
tax agents. 
 
The entire population of Western Australian tax agents registered with the Tax Agents’ 
Board comprised the sample frame. A self-reporting questionnaire, described in the next 
section, was mailed to the 1,960 subjects. After four weeks a copy of the questionnaire, with a 
modified covering reminder letter, was mailed to each subject.  
 
3.2   Research instrument 
 
The research being reported on was part of a study conducted to explore both the 
perceptions of tax agents regarding the ethical environment in which they practice and to 
investigate the effect of selected variables on ethical decision making in tax practice. As a     11
     
consequence, the self-administered questionnaire developed for the study had two primary 
components. The first part of the instrument, designed to measure the frequency of occurrence 
and importance of ethical issues in tax practice, was a close-ended question format. The other 
section, directly relevant to this study, presented two variations of a common scenario to test 
the effect of selected situational variables (manipulated across respondents on a random basis) 
hypothesised to influence tax agents’ perceived ethical judgments. 
 
Scenarios (vignettes) are considered to have significant advantages over alternative 
data-gathering techniques in studies of judgment formation on sensitive topics such as ethics 
research. The key benefit, according to Alexander and Becker (1987), is that “by employing 
systematic variation in vignette content, the researcher is able to measure the determinants of 
respondent opinion more accurately than could be accomplished by the use of direct 
questioning…” (p.103).  
 
A potential problem with scenario formats, however, is that of vagueness and generality 
(Randall and Gibson, 1990). In anticipation of this problem, the aim was to develop realistic 
scenarios. Accordingly, each of the scenarios involved a specific ethical dilemma that a tax 
agent might face in a day-to-day situation. Further, each of the scenarios should have been 
understandable to anyone with a sound technical background in tax matters. The factual 
statements were followed by several action choices/responses. In relation to the testing of the 
independent variable “audit risk”, there were two primary variations on the first factual 
scenario presented to respondents. The full version of each of these two variations of the first 
scenario is at Appendix 1.  
 
A pilot study was conducted in an attempt to increase the reliability and validity of the 
measures contained in the instrument. It also facilitated a scrutiny of any ambiguity or lack of 
clarity in the instructions or wording of the questionnaire, missing/inappropriate questions, 
confusing response categories etc and the appropriateness of the mailing procedure. A small 
number, seven, of pilot subjects was selected to participate in the pre-test. An attempt was 
made to achieve the broadest range of respondent types, so as to ensure that the instrument 
would be understandable across a wide spectrum of the population. Accordingly, subjects 
ranged from an academic, a tax partner in a Big 5 public accounting firm, through to a part-
time sole practitioner with only twenty clients. 
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Subjects were advised that feedback was being sought on such issues as the length of 
the questionnaire (time taken to complete) and whether the presented scenarios did involve 
ethical tax issues. As a result of the pre-test a number of changes were made to the instrument. 
The final mailing consisted of the revised questionnaire, a cover letter (which explained the 
nature of the study, provided general instructions for completing the survey instrument and 
assured confidentiality of responses) and a stamped pre-addressed return envelope.  
 
This scenario centred on the deductibility of overseas travel expenses (undocumented 
versus personal expenses/fraud) for an individual taxpayer. This tax issue was chosen for 
three reasons. First, the use of a deduction issue was anticipated to provide more realism to 
the case. Research involving CPAs in the U.S. (Westat Survey, 1987) indicated that 70% of 
tax preparer/client conflicts involving a tax return position were related to a deduction issue. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the situation in Australia would differ significantly. 
Second, given the various levels of technical knowledge and experience of tax agent 
respondents the issue was designed to be familiar to, and capable of resolution by all 
respondents. Finally, it provided for a simple differentiation of the severity of the tax law 
violation: lack of documentation (failure to adhere to the letter of the law) versus potential 
fraud.  
 
To overcome a possible tax rate effect identified in some experimental studies i.e., an 
incentive to report less income as the tax rate increases (see, for example, Collins and 
Plumlee, 1991), the income was set at such a level that the tax rate was constant regardless of 
the action adopted by the tax agent. Manipulation of the independent variables (audit risk, 
materiality and severity of the issue) was accomplished by varying the information given in 
the two situations (see Appendix 2 for the range of presented situations) across individual 
respondents. The aim was to determine the significance of the three independent variables in 
influencing perceived ethical judgments. This defined 12 possible combinations of scenario1 
according to: size of tax deduction x type of claim x audit risk. All tests of hypotheses were, 
therefore, of a between subject design in order to avoid hypothesis guessing by the 
respondents.      
 
Respondents were instructed to read the scenario and then to code their specification of 
the likelihood of taking each of the presented action choices, considered independently, on a 
seven-point Likert scale. These action choices/responses are identified and described in     13
     
Table 1. The scale ranged from 1 (“definitely would not take this action”), to 7 (“definitely 
would take this action”). The dependent variable was the respondent’s likelihood of taking 
each action choice. To operationalise the testing, the hypotheses were specified with respect 
to the specific respondent action choices which reflected deontological norms/rules 
established in the codes of the professional accounting bodies (Institute of Chartered 
Accountants-ICAA; Australian Society of Certified Practicing Accountants-ASCPA) in 
Australia i.e., joint ‘Statement of Taxation Standards (APS 6)’. 
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
 
Action choices A, C and D are considered unethical acts in that they violate 
responsibilities imposed by income tax law as well as the professional aspects of tax practice 
addressed in APS 6. Specifically:  
 
‘16. A member shall in no circumstances become associated with any return 
or submission on behalf of a client if the member finds that material on 
which  the  return  or  submission  is  to  be  based  contains  incorrect  or 
misleading information or omits material information’.  
 
Action choice E is ethical in that it does not violate income tax law or the professional code 
of ethics: 
 
’17. A member who becomes aware of a return or submission being based 
on  incorrect  or  misleading  information  …must  immediately  discuss  the 
matter with his client and endeavour to persuade the client to correct any 
misstatement  or  omission  involved  and  to  have  the  return  or  submission 
prepared on a proper basis. If the client fails to do so, the member must not 
be further associated with that return or submission, and must refuse to act 
in any capacity with respect to such a return or submission…’ 
  
 The action choices B and F are not clearly ethical or unethical choices (i.e., “mixed” or 
“neutral”). Action F is considered, at one level, ethical in that the return is prepared in 
accordance with the law. However, the lack of discussion with the client taxpayer  would 
violate an “integrity” requirement to communicate to the client unfavourable as well as     14
     
favourable information and professional opinions and to maintain open, frank and effective 
communications with their clients. Although action choice B represents the exercise of 
reasonable professional care it is contrary to the confidentiality requirements of APS 6:  
 
‘15. Unless he has a legal or professional duty to disclose, a member must 
not convey any information relating to a client’s affairs to a third party 
without his client’s permission’. 
 
4.   Data Analysis and Results 
 
4.1   Response and Subjects’ Demographics 
 
The returned questionnaires provided a usable response rate of 23.6% (409/1734 – 
sample of 1960 letters sent minus 226 out of frame). This rate lies within the model range of 
20%-40% for most social science mail surveys (Kerlinger, 1973). It is comparable to response 
rates of 26.6% and 21.5% as reported by Finn, Chonko and Hunt (1988) and Leung, Cooper 
and Gavin (1993) in studies of ethical issues in public accounting in the U.S. and Australia, 
respectively. 
 
Although the credibility of mail survey research findings is considered to be largely a 
function of response rates, Leslie (1972) suggests that significant non-response bias is 
unlikely in a situation such as this, where the survey is made of relatively homogeneous 
populations i.e., persons having a strong group identity. Further, no significant differences 
were found between “late” respondents (those whose questionnaires were received after the 
second mailing) and “early” respondents (those received prior to the first mailing).    
 
Table 2 contains demographic data for individual respondents. A review of the data 
indicates that a wide variety of tax agents were represented. The majority of respondents were 
male (88%), with an average of 17.7 years of tax experience. The respondents’ age 
distribution was relatively uniform across categories from 31-60, with some drop off in the 
above 60 and below 31 age groups.  
 
Although firm size (based on the number of tax professionals and gross tax fee income) 
varied substantially, a large percentage of the respondents operated as sole practitioners,     15
     
practicing either in their own name or through a private company structure (71%). 
Professional accounting qualifications were held by a large majority (76%), while forty 
percent of respondents were members of an independent professional tax association, the 
Taxation Institute of Australia. A majority of respondents (53%) conduct tax planning, 
research and tax return preparation, but many (43%) only prepare tax returns. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
4.2   Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 3 shows the observed means for each of the six action choices arising from the 
manipulations of the three independent variables. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
Two general and preliminary observations can be made regarding this data. First, the 
means for those action choices identified previously as neither ethical nor unethical i.e., 
“notify the ATO” (B) and “leave out the expenses without informing the client” (F), 
congregate around the lower end of the evaluation scale (<2). This indicates that regardless of 
the manipulation of the variables, tax agents perceive little likelihood of adopting either of 
these action choices.  
 
The second observation relates to the apparent strength of the tax agent-client 
relationship in the adoption of tax reporting positions when the interpretation of the tax law, 
or its application to the taxpayer’s facts, is unclear. The mean for action choice A i.e., “Take 
whatever action you are directed to by the client”, remained relatively high (approx. 5) for all 
manipulations of the variables. It is worth noting that similar data, consistent with a client 
driven tax preparer-client relationship, were obtained by Schisler (1995), even in the U.S. 
environment of tax preparer penalties. In contrast to tax practice in Australia where the direct 
penalty structure applies only to the taxpayer, in the U.S. a monetary penalty is imposed 
directly on tax return preparers who fail to exercise a certain degree of care and accuracy 
(“realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits”) in determining a taxpayer’s tax 
liability.    
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4.3  Analysis of variance 
 
To test the hypotheses the data were subject to univariate analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) in order to identify any statistically significant effect (p<.05) on the various action 
choices as the respective independent variables (audit risk, amount and severity) were 
manipulated. Separate ANOVAs were required for each action choice, i.e., the analysis 
attempted to associate the variation in each dependent variable (action choice) with a single 
independent explanatory variable. 
 
4.4   Testing hypothesis: H1 
 
The probability of audit detection will influence a tax agent’s perceived ethical 
judgments. 
 
To test this hypothesis, three levels of audit probability were manipulated within the 
alternative factual statements of Scenario 1. The lowest level, corresponding with the overall 
percentage level of ATO audit penetration (i.e., 1% of all taxpayers), was set at 1%, with 
higher levels presented as 10% and 50%. 
  
Consistent with the approach of Duncan et al. (1989) in their study of the judgment 
processes of professional tax managers, the aim was to set more “realistic” rates than had 
been common in earlier studies. For example, Kaplan et al. (1988) only used rates of 10% and 
50% whilst a rate of 90% was applied in the study conducted by Chang et al. (1987). In 
determining “realistic” rates for this study, regard was paid to the fact that the respondents 
were tax agents. Many would therefore have been familiar with the ATO audit selection 
process and been involved in audit activities on behalf of their clients. Their knowledge of 
actual/normal audit levels therefore limited the breadth of believable manipulations. 
 
Accordingly, audit risk manipulation represented the independent variable for testing 
relevant to this paper. The base level case (coded “0”) provided a “1% chance that the ATO 
would detect the claim through a random audit process”. In the second treatment (coded “1”) 
there was a “10% chance of the claim being detected by an ATO random audit process”. In 
the most extreme manipulation of the audit risk variable (coded “2”), the focus was on the tax 
agent’s own clients with a correspondingly high risk of audit detection: “There is a 50%     17
     
chance that the ATO will detect this claim through an audit of all your clients”. The dependent 
variable was the score on the 1-7 Likert scale in terms of a respondent’s willingness to take 
each of the presented action choices. These actions had been categorised by the researcher as 
“ethical”, “unethical” or “mixed/neutral”.  
 
Table 4 presents the ANOVA results for the independent variable “audit risk” 
 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
 
The results indicate that changes in audit risk/probability (at 1%, 10% and 50% levels) 
have no significant effect, at the .05 level, on tax agents’ perceptions of ethical judgments as 
represented by the various action choices A-F. 
 
Based on these results, Hypothesis H1 cannot be supported for any of the action 
choices. These findings contrast with those found in other studies (e.g., Chang et al., 1987); 
Madeo et al., 1987; and Kaplan et al., 1988), in which audit probability was found to be 
significantly related to the tax positions that subjects adopted. Those studies, as previously 
described, did involve variation of audit levels at more extreme levels and used taxpayers 
rather than tax practitioners as subjects.  
 
The results are, however, consistent with the findings of Duncan et al. (1989). 
Apparently the audit probability at the manipulated levels is not strong enough to affect the 
tax practitioner’s decision making, notwithstanding the empirical evidence referred to above 
which indicates that the reporting positions of taxpayers (particularly those who are risk 
averse) are influenced by changes in the audit risk.  
 
4.5   Testing hypothesis: H2 
 
The dollar amount of a client’s tax law violation will influence a tax agent’s perceived 
ethical judgments. 
 
Two levels of disputed deductions were manipulated for the testing of this hypothesis. 
The amount of overseas travel expenses manipulation was a binary variable specified as either 
$400 (coded “0”), a relatively insignificant amount, or $10,000 (coded “1”).      18
     
Table 5 shows the univariate results of the effect of the amount of the tax law violation, 
as operationalised through the probability of engaging in the various tax return preparation 
action choices. 
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
The amount of the tax law violation was only significant at the .05 level in respect of the 
neutral ethical action choice F, i.e., “Prepare the tax return leaving out the travel expenses, 
without informing the client”. Although this effect is statistically significant, and intuitively in 
the expected direction that tax agents are less likely to take this action when the contentious 
amount is large, the difference in the absolute magnitude of the means is relatively small and 
is activated from a very low base. For all practical purposes, then, Hypothesis 2 cannot be 
supported on the basis of these results. 
 
4.6   Testing hypothesis: H3 
 
The severity of violation of the tax law by a client will influence a tax agent’s perceived 
ethical judgments. 
 
The specific issue used as the defacto variable “severity of violation of the tax law”, was 
the deductibility of overseas travel expenses. In the first treatment (coded “0”), the claim 
represented a situation in which deductible expenses had been incurred but the supporting 
documentation had not been maintained (substantiation-letter of the law not satisfied). By 
contrast, in the second version (coded “1”) the claim related to legally non-deductible 
expenses: “The problem, however, is that on the basis of information from another client you 
are certain that the expenditure relates to personal expenses of Mr Smith’s wife. Mr Smith’s 
wife is not associated with the business”.   
 
Table 6 summarises the ANOVA results of the effect of the “severity” independent 
variable.  
 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
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Severity of the tax law violation - essentially lack of documentation versus fraud – was 
significant at p<0.05 to three action choices: C – “Prepare the return deducting the expenses, 
but refuse to sign the return” (unethical; p=.012); D – “Deduct the travel expenses and sign 
the return without consulting the client” (unethical; p=.002); and E – “Refuse to prepare the 
tax return” (ethical; p=.000). These results indicate that the severity/type of tax law violation 
does have a significant influence on the ethical perceptions of tax agents in relation to a range 
of ethical choices available to them in the preparation of a tax return. However, the most 
likely/“typical” action choice (based on respondent means) i.e., A – “Take whatever action 
you are directed to by the client”, was not similarly influenced by manipulations of the 
severity variable. 
 
The results for the two action choices presented in this study as neither ethical nor 
unethical (“neutral/mixed”): B -  “Notify the ATO”; and F – “Prepare the tax return leaving 
out the travel expenses without informing the client”, can be excluded from the analysis. 
These choices had been included on the questionnaire for response completeness. However, 
as there is no conceptually “right” action choice from an ethical perspective, the interpretation 
of any results for these choices would merely be speculative.  
 
5.   Discussion 
 
5.1  Severity 
 
The results in respect of the independent variable “severity”, particularly when 
considered in conjunction with the means in Table 2, provide some support for the 
expectation that tax agents are more likely to be reluctant to prepare a tax return where the 
disputed issue represents an unambiguous violation of tax law. That is, where the reporting 
position is legally deterministic, given the facts and circumstances, rather than a mere lack of 
documentation (mean responses for action choice E of 2.67 and 3.46 respectively). 
 
These results are consistent with the findings of Buttross (1991) and provide qualified 
support for Hypothesis 3. A perhaps surprising result, though, is that the mean rating of the 
“fraudulent” position was still below the mid-point score of 4 (action choice E) and above 4 
for action choice A. It is possible that subjects did not regard choice A as an unethical option, 
rather their responses indicated an aggressive versus conservative approach to tax reporting.     20
     
Although there will always be controversy as to the boundaries of ethical responsibilities, 
there is general acceptance that a tax agent has a fundamental role as that of client advocate 
i.e., that the tax agent acts in the best interest of the client (the taxpayer). Consistent with this 
role is an incentive to recommend or support reporting positions that are more or less 
aggressive as the client wishes (Klepper and Nagin, 1991; Johnson, 1993). In Australia, this 
primary responsibility has been accepted and legitimised by both the ASCPA and the ICAA: 
 
    “23. A member has a duty to use professional knowledge to enable a client to obtain 
the most favourable tax position consistent with the desire of the client and the 
requirements of full disclosure and of the law generally” (APS6 – Statement of 
Taxation Standards). 
 
Given, however, that the survey instrument was not designed to test specifically for 
explanatory factors as to the degree of response change, further examination of this matter lies 
outside the scope of this survey. Further, it is a matter of conjecture as to what extent the 
particular type of tax issue utilised in the scenario i.e., overstatement of a dubious deduction, 
is a governing factor in tax agent responses to the various ethical action choices presented to 
them in this study.  
 
Studies at the taxpayer level (Hasseldine, Kaplan and Fuller, 1994; Christensen and 
Hite, 1997) indicate that income under-reporting and deduction overstating are affected by 
different variables. For example, and leaving aside non-compliant effects arising from mistake 
or accidental error, the findings of Thurman (1991) suggest that “guilt” feelings may operate 
to inhibit deduction overstating (acts of commission) relative to income under-reporting (acts 
of omission). In social psychology research (see Spranca, Minsk and Baron, 1991) acts of 
harmful commission tend to be rated as more immoral or bad decisions than equivalent 
harmful commissions.  In addition, income and deduction situations will be subject to 
different structural opportunities to avoid taxation. Accordingly, the suggestion from 
Hasseldine (1999) that future research designed to examine taxpayer compliance decisions 
should study income and deduction decisions separately, is acknowledged and its extension to 
tax practitioner based compliance research recommended. 
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5.2   Audit Risk 
 
Perhaps the finding of most practical significance arising from this study is the lack of 
support for audit risk as an influential variable in tax agents’ ethical decision making. 
Policy makers and revenue authorities have generally proceeded on the premise that under a 
self-assessment tax system increasing audit probabilities (or taxpayers’ perceptions that audit 
probabilities/detection are increasing) will encourage taxpayers to adopt less aggressive tax 
reporting and compliance positions. Empirical research into taxpayer attitudes and audit risk 
provide support for this basic premise.  
 
In contrast, at least with regard to the situations described in the scenario settings, this 
research at the tax practitioner level suggests that increasing the likelihood of tax audit 
activity may not significantly influence decision-making by tax agents when advising their 
clients. This assumes, of course, that audit levels need to be set at “realistic” rather than 
“saturation” levels given the limited resources of the ATO and the impact on compliance 
costs for tax agents and their clients. The consequence is that the efficacy of, and emphasis 
on, the basic audit function in monitoring and mitigating non-compliant tax behaviour of tax 
agents under a self- assessment tax system would need to be questioned.  Alternative 
enforcement and compliance strategies would then have to be given greater consideration by 
tax administrators. 
 
It must be remembered that the study does not attempt to extrapolate tax agent 
perceptions of ethical issues and preferred action choices to ethical/unethical tax agent 
behaviour. If, however, these results are confirmed in subsequent studies involving different 
tax issues (including both income and deduction adjustments), tax scenarios and audit 
probability manipulations, then the strong inference is that tax practitioners may be 
moderating taxpayer concerns relative to audit risk. It has already been suggested by Erard 
(1993) that audit risk is diminished significantly because of the notion that tax practitioners 
are more experienced and adept at finding a supportable/arguable basis for sustaining 
reporting positions: 
 
“Tax practitioners undoubtedly fulfil a socially beneficial role in reducing 
many of the informational and computational barriers to clients with tax     22
     
laws. However, the results indicate that their use, most especially the use of 
CPAs and lawyers, is associated with a higher level of non-compliance, 
which  can  have  negative  consequences  for  both  tax  equity  and  tax 
efficiency" (p.194).   
 
The overall effect would be to dilute the effectiveness of increased levels of audit 
probability as an ATO policy measure under a self-assessment system. This is particularly so 
in a complex taxation environment in which Australian taxpayers increasingly are effectively 
transferring their taxation obligations, including the filing of accurate annual income tax 
returns, to tax agents. In such a context, impetus may be given to the introduction of a new 
penalty structure in Australia to govern both taxpayers and tax agents in relation to positions 
taken on tax return preparation.  
 
Currently, under Australian tax law taxpayers are vicariously liable for a failure by their 
tax agents to exercise “reasonable care” or, in certain situations, to have adopted “reasonably 
arguable” reporting positions, when providing tax advice or preparing returns. Accordingly, 
they are liable for a penalty should there be a shortfall in the amount of tax which arises. A 
taxpayer does have the right to recover from a tax agent any additional penalty tax or interest 
imposed, but only in circumstances where the taxpayer can prove negligence on the part of 
the tax agent (section 251M of the Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936).  
 
In conjunction with the National Review’s recommendations for “safe harbour” 
legislation, and the drafting of a Code of Practice for tax agents, to protect clients from 
penalties arising from errors by their tax agents, consideration could be given to legislating for 
tax return preparer penalties similar to those introduced in the U.S. in 1989. As currently 
applied, these penalties are directed to “unrealistic positions” adopted by tax return preparers. 
In essence, under this penalty regime U.S. tax return preparers are required to undertake 
reasonable enquiries and to avoid positions that subject the client to penalties. 
 
A perceived benefit of the stricter penalty regime would be the “encouragement” offered 
to tax agents to provide more positive directions to clients when recommending reporting 
positions to be adopted. Kinsey (1987), admittedly prior to the introduction of U.S. preparer 
penalties, in a survey of Chicago tax practitioners had found that the basic reporting procedure 
of most respondents was to “outline the options and leave it to the clients to decide”.  This     23
     
approach is mirrored in the action choice responses shown in Table 1, with all mean responses 
to the action choice: “Take whatever action you are directed to by the client”, exceeding 4.5 
for each situation and for the manipulation of both of the variables: audit risk and severity. 
 
It could, of course, be contended that in respect of those tax agents who hold 
professional accounting qualifications (the large majority of respondents in this survey) that 
tax preparer penalties would be both too onerous and unnecessary. They are already governed 
by certain behavioural/ethical rules and guidelines established by their professional 
accounting bodies. In response to this argument, members generally are not required to 
substantiate information provided to them by taxpayers and are given considerable latitude in 
their interpretation of ambiguous or contentious features of tax legislation. Erard (1993) 
reported on an IRS sponsored national survey of tax practitioners and  advisers based on 
personal interviews: 
 
“Over 60 % of CPAs and lawyers at least partially approve of signing a 
return without seeing the full documentation, if the possibility exists that the 
client will later produce it; many indicate a tendency not to probe in-depth 
for  secondary  sources  of  income;  and  the  vast  majority  are  inclined  to 
resolve all questionable items on a return that have a reasonable basis in 
favor of the client” (p.167).      
 
Unfortunately, similar data is not available in Australia and it is a matter of supposition as to 
whether the views are representative of Australian tax agents. 
 
There is, however, another aspect to be considered in the public policy debate as to 
whether “incorrect return penalties” should be imposed at the tax agent level. If the tax 
profession is to fulfil the “socially beneficial” role ascribed to it by commentators and the 
ATO by facilitating a reduction of taxpayers’ uncertainty as to their tax obligations, then the 
introduction of tax preparer penalties might be counter-productive. This is particularly 
relevant where the issues are unambiguous and legally deterministic. In this environment 
taxpayers who engage tax agents to prepare their tax returns would incur two types of cost. 
One would be the cost of compensating the tax agent for his/her time. The other, and 
additional, cost would represent a “risk premium” to cover the possible imposition of preparer     24
     
culpability penalties for endorsing inaccurate/otherwise non-compliant returns, or those 
returns which contain issues likely to be challenged by the ATO. 
 
In relation to the less complex/unambiguous returns the “risk premium” to be borne 
indirectly by the individual taxpayer as part of the tax return preparation fee may be 
disproportionately high. This is because the preparer would not be able to mitigate penalties 
imposed for undetected non-compliance such as the omission of bank interest. In the case of 
more complex returns, there is likely to be disagreement between a well-informed tax agent 
armed with a “reasonable argument/reasonably arguable” position and the ATO (with the 
courts as the final arbiter), as to the correct interpretation or the application of the statute or 
case law to the particular facts. Here, the severity of any penalty imposed will be diminished 
in relative terms. It is in these circumstances and in regard to the more complex returns, where 
the revenue is most at risk, that clients will be more likely to be amenable to bearing a “risk 
premium”. Certainly, it could be justified on economic grounds alone.  
 
Tax preparer penalties may therefore discourage the use of tax agents to prepare returns 
and provide informed tax advice, safe harbour provisions notwithstanding, in relation to that 
very range of clients that it is in the best interests of the ATO, and the efficient operation of 
the tax system generally, to foster an ongoing client-tax agent relationship. These “at risk” 
client taxpayers are likely to lack the time, knowledge or financial sophistication to be 
informed adequately as to their tax obligations.  
 
6.   Conclusions and limitations 
 
This research was set against the background of a focus on the increasing role of tax 
agents in the preparation of tax returns and the provision of professional tax advice under a 
tax system based on self-assessment principles.  
 
In considering the conclusions to be drawn, it should be borne in mind that the study 
represents only a “snapshot” of tax agent responses at a time when both the profession and the 
tax system are under review and subject to major and ongoing changes. An important 
extension to this study would be the development and implementation of longitudinal 
measures, preferably on a national basis, to track changes in perceptions over time.  
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Based on overseas empirical research into taxpayer attitudes towards audit risk, it was 
hypothesised that tax agents would also be influenced by the likelihood of audit action in their 
perceptions of decision making in ethical situations. However, the results suggest that 
increasing levels of probability of audit (within realistic levels) do not significantly affect tax 
agents’ perceived ethical judgments. This lack of empirical evidence has important 
implications for the formulation of ATO audit policy to underpin the move towards a full self-
assessment tax system in Australia.  
 
It may be that Australian tax administrators would be encouraged to push for the 
introduction of a U.S. style tax agent penalty structure in an attempt to develop a more 
“conservative” approach on the part of tax agents in the adoption of reporting positions on 
contentious issues and with respect to the adequacy of information disclosure. However, by 
raising the stakes for tax agent decision judgments under such a system the inevitable 
consequence will be a strain on the client advocacy role of the tax agent. The general 
acceptance of the tax agent as a key player in the effective administration of a voluntary self-
assessing tax system will then be put at risk.  
 
Accordingly, the preferred tax compliance approach for the ATO may be to reduce its 
focus on the existing enforcement activities that are based primarily on an audit function with 
the threat of legal sanctions and penalties. More emphasis and resources could then be 
directed to “positive” tax enforcement strategies such as public education campaigns, 
identifying and targeting sub-groups of “at risk” tax agents/clients and the further 
development of tax agent support mechanisms.          
 
The primary limitation associated with scenario research is the possibility of a lack of 
task realism. Although the scenario approach lends itself to manipulation of selected 
independent variables, realism and the ambiguity which often characterise tax agent 
deliberations may have been sacrificed for controllability. The exploratory nature of the 
research also adds potential problems, given that the research instrument was designed for this 
particular study and has not been validated externally. Validation could be achieved by 
longitudinal applications of the same instrument. Furthermore, the responses may not extend 
to scenarios based on other tax issues, or which relate to clients exhibiting different 
characteristics and needs. Additional research, using different scenarios should be undertaken     26
     
to overcome the possibility that the results are mere artefacts of the particular scenarios used 
in this research. 
 
Future research will also be needed to investigate whether and/or to what extent 
situational variables such as audit risk interact with characteristics and personality traits of the 
tax practitioners themselves to influence their ethical perceptions and judgments. Relevant 
attributes for study may include tax agents’ experience, level of technical knowledge, ethical 
predispositions, attitudes towards risk and perceptions of the equity and fairness of the tax 
system. 
 
The final caveat is that the findings cannot be generalised to other population groups in 
the tax environment, beyond Western Australian tax agents. This study does, however, 
provide a methodology for researching the influence of situational variables such as audit risk 
on ethical decision- making. Longitudinal research, preferably on a national basis, and 
comparative international research is needed so that comparisons can be made with the results 
of this study before any general hypotheses can be formulated. Further, the extent to which 
the results here are applicable to other groups of tax professionals e.g., in-house corporate tax 
accountants and lawyers, also is not known. Additional study is required in order to determine 
and evaluate whether these groups differ in their ethical perceptions of dilemmas which arise 
in the preparation of tax returns and in transacting other matters with the ATO on behalf of 
clients.  
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ACTION CHOICE/       
     RESPONSE           ACTION RESPONSE DESCRIPTION 
 
 
A  Advise the client of your concerns and the relevant 
requirements under the Income Tax Assessment Act. Take 
whatever action you are directed to by the client. 
 
B  Notify or threaten to notify the ATO if the travel expenses are 
deducted against your advice. 
 
C  Discuss the matter with the client. If you are directed to claim 
the expenses prepare the tax return deducting the expenses, but 
refuse to sign the return. 
 
D  Deduct the travel expenses and sign the return without 
consulting the client. 
   
E  Discuss the matter with the client. If you are directed to claim 
the expenses, refuse to prepare the tax return. 
 
F  Prepare the tax return leaving out the travel expenses, without 
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Table 2:  Tax Agent Characteristics 
  
 




%  Dominant Tax Work 




Sole Practice  269  65.8  Return preparation  174  43 
Partnership (2 partners)    58  14.2  Tax Planning Consulting  17    4.2 
Partnership  (3  or  more 
partners) 
  47  11.5  All of the above   214  52.8 
Partnership (‘Big 6’)     8    2.0  Total   405   
Private Company   19    4.6  Level  of  Education{tc  \l1 
"Level of Education} 
   
Tax Return Preparation     5    1.2  No tertiary education   35    8.6 
Service (Shop Front)      Technical college   86  21.2 
Other     3    0.7  Undergraduate/graduate 
degree 
 284  70.2 
Total  409    Total   405   
           
Tax Experience(Years)           
Range  3-50    Gender{tc \l1 "Gender}     
Mode  20    Male     357  88.1 
Mean  17.7    Female  49  11.9 
      Total   406   
Age           
21-30    43  10.6.  Ethics  Training{tc  \l1 
"Ethics Training} 
   
31-40  108  26.5  No ethics training  88  21.5 
41-50  135  33.2  Professional development  260  63.5 
51-60    81  19.9  During tertiary studies   50  12.3 
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Membership of Professional Bodies 
   
Accounting Associations  Taxation Institute of Australia 
 
  No.  %    No.  % 
None  54  13.3  Yes  160  39.3 
ASCPA  218  53.8  No  247  60.7 
ICAA  78  19.3  Total  407   
ASCPA & ICAA  28  6.9       












Tax Work (%) 
Range  1-120  0-25  29 
Mode  1  25-50  59 
Median  1  50-75  114 












Gross Fees (Tax Work) 
 
  %   
0 -$25,000  25.7 
25,000-50,000  10.2 
50,000-500,000  49.0 
Above $500,000  15.1 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: The totals vary for some demographic items because a few respondents did not 
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0    1 
SEVERITY 
0    1 
AUDIT RISK 
0              1             2 
A    5.87  4.79  5.11  4.77  4.81  4.87  5.13 
B    1.50  1.66  1.58  1.56  1.59  1.64  1.51 
C    2.53  2.73  2.38  2.88  2.61  2.66  2.61 
D    1.69  1.49  1.38  1.81  1.61  1.56  1.61 
E    2.89  3.27  2.67  3.46  3.12  3.13  2.97 
F    1.69  1.28  1.41  1.59  1.51  1.35  1.61 
 
     
 




df  Mean 
Square 
F  Sig. 
A  Between Groups  2  4.069  1.104  .332 
B  Between Groups  2  .636  .391  .677 
C  Between Groups  2  .121  .031  .970 
D  Between Groups  2  .0069  .035  .965 
E  Between Groups  2  1.223  .254  .776 
F  Between Groups  2  2.267  1.400  .248 
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Table 5:  Effect of the Amount of the Tax Law Violation 
 
 
Action Choice  df  Mean 
Square 
F  Sig. 
A Between Groups  1  7.750  2.108  .147 
B Between Groups  1  2.589  1.597  .207 
C Between Groups  1  4.066  1.047  .307 
D Between Groups  1  3.888  2.003  .158 
E Between Groups  1  14.853  3.114  .078 





Table 6:  Effect of the Severity of the Tax Law Violation 
 
Action Response  df  Mean 
Square 
F  Sig. 
A Between  Groups  1  11.560  3.153  .077 
B Between Groups  1  .0040  .025  .876 
C Between Groups  1  24.379  6.363  .012 
D Between Groups  1  18.490  9.710  .002 
E Between Groups  1  63.203  13.597  .000 
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Scenario:  Factual Situation 1 
 
 
You are preparing the income tax return for an individual sole trader, Robert Smith, who 
manufactures mining equipment. Sales and taxable income, without consideration of the 
following item are $300,000 and $85,000 respectively. 
 
Robert Smith is a new client, but to the best of your knowledge he has always filed an 
accurate income tax return. You are concerned about a proposed deduction for expenses of  
$400 associated with a trip to Europe undertaken by the client to review existing marketing 
and distribution arrangements for the equipment. You are certain the expenditures were 
actually incurred and that they are legitimate business expenses. The problem, however, is 
that Robert Smith cannot reconstruct accurately the expenses and has not kept any supporting 
documentation (e.g., travel diary, hotel receipts etc.). 
 
There is a 1% chance that the ATO will detect this claim through a random audit process. 
 
 
Scenario:  Factual Situation 2 
 
 
The same introductory facts are presented as in Situation 1 above. In this situation, however: 
 
The expenses were actually incurred and Robert Smith can reconstruct accurately the 
expenses. He has kept full supporting documentation (e.g., travel diary, hotel receipts etc.), 
The problem, however, is that on the basis of information from another client you are certain 
that the expenditure relates to personal expenses of Mr Smith’s wife. Mrs Smith is not 
associated with the business. 
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Research Scenario:  Independent Variable Manipulations 
 
 
Independent Variable: Dollar Amount 
 
 
Level 1  $400 taxable income reduction                    * (0) 
 
Level 2  $10,000 taxable income reduction                       (1) 
 
 
Independent Variable: Severity of Tax Issue  
 
 
Level 1  Undocumented travel expenses                       (0) 
    (Factual situation 1, Appendix 1) 
 
Level 2  Personal expenses treated as overseas travel expenses                      (1) 
    (Factual situation 2, Appendix 1) 
 
 
Independent Variable: Audit Risk 
 
 
Level 1  1% chance of the claim being detected by an ATO random audit    (0) 
 
Level 2  10% chance of the claim being detected by an ATO random 
    Industry audit                             (1) 
 
Level 3  50% chance of the claim being detected by an ATO audit of the  
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